

Memorandum on possible language for an amendment to  
cut off all military aid to Argentina

April 14, 1977

The areas which should be covered are:

- \*\*Foreign Military Sales Credits
  - (FY78 request: \$15 million)
  - (in the pipeline: \$54.4 million)
- \*\*FMS Cash Sales: FY78 estimated total: \$15 million
- \*\*IMETP Training: FY78 request: \$700,000 for 186 students
- \*\*(possibly): U.S. Military Group (advisors): FY 78 request: 20

Attached is the language from the 1976 International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act (PL 94-329) which cut off aid to Chile. This amendment is attached for reference purposes. A similar amendment for Argentina might look like this:

"No military or security supporting assistance and no military education and training may be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for Argentina; and no credits (including participations in credits) may be extended and no loan may be guaranteed under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Argentina. No deliveries of any such assistance, credits, or guaranties may be made to Argentina on or after the date of enactment of this section, and no prior credits or guaranties as yet unexpended (unobligated?) as of the date of enactment of this section may be expended (obligated?) after such date. No sales (including cash sales) may be made and no export license may be issued under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Argentina on or after the date of enactment of this section. No Military Group, Defense Field Office, Office of Defense Co-operation, or Defense Attache Office or other organization of United States military personnel performing similar military advisory functions under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 may operate in Argentina after the date of enactment of this section."

Following is a brief analysis of each form of aid and the major arguments against them:

FMS Credits: The reduced Administration request for FMS credits for Argentina was rejected by the Videla regime. Clearly, however, the State Dept. hopes to talk the Argentines out of this rejection (the same with Brazil, El Salvador and Guatemala) and therefore wants the authority to extend these credits to remain in the security assistance program. If this effort were successful the Administration could reap the publicity benefits of the initial reduction without any harm to the Argentina program. The reduction has had no measurable impact on the Argentine regime; in fact eleven major public figures were kidnapped and disappeared during the period that Pat Derien of the State Dept. Human Rights Office was visiting that country in early April. With respect to the pipeline, this amount is nearly four times the FY78 request. The State Dept. has said that this money has been held up because of the human rights situation; however, it is standard practice in most cases not to obligate FMS credit funds until the end of the fiscal year anyway. Furthermore, the recent case of Zaire shows that the Administration will use pipeline funds whenever it sees fit, even in the face of Congressional opposition.

FMS Cash Sales: The estimated FY78 Cash Sales total is \$15 million, a figure three times larger than the FY77 estimate. In fact, it could be said that the slack created by the reduction in the credit program is being taken up by the cash sales program. It is often argued that cash sales cover mostly spare parts and maintenance. However, an examination of recent cash sales to Argentina shows a number of UH-1H helicopters (standard counter-insurgency craft) and training programs in jungle operations, military intelligence and urban warfare.

IMETP Training: The current head of Argentina's secret police (SIDE) heads the list of Argentine graduates of U.S. training programs. Defense Department tables show that Argentine personnel have been trained at the School of the Americas

(Canal Zone) in urban counter-insurgency, military intelligence, jungle operations, and interrogation techniques. The training program for Argentina is a classic example of how this component of security assistance disproportionately strengthens the military at the expense of democratic and civilian forces. Officials at State and Defense proudly defend the training program for its "Americanizing" and "democratizing" influences; clearly the result is exactly the opposite.

U.S. Advisors: Congress ordered these programs phased out by the end of FY77 (section 104 of the 1976 International Security and Arms Export Control Act), yet the Administration is requesting special legislation to continue almost every program. (This request appears as Title of H.R. 5747 on the House side). The arguments against these programs are well known; in the case of Argentina, there have been frequent although unconfirmed reports that U.S. advisors are active in the northern region of Tucuman province, assisting the Argentine army and police in counter-insurgency operations. (Since special enabling legislation is necessary to continue the advisor programs; it may be that no language would be necessary in this amendment if an overall move were made to defeat the whole program. If there is no such move, however, a special deletion for Argentina would be necessary.)

Attached for reference in the Chile amendment from 1976, a more detailed fact sheet on U.S. military aid to Argentina, the relevant material from the FY78 Congressional Presentation Document, and recent newsclips.

From the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act  
of 1976 (PL 94-329)

LIMITATIONS ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, MILITARY ASSISTANCE, SALES, AND  
SALES CREDITS FOR CHILE

SEC. 406. (a) (1) No military or security supporting assistance and no military education and training may be furnished under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 for Chile; and no credits (including participations in credits) may be extended and no loan may be guaranteed under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Chile. No deliveries of any such assistance, credits, or guaranties may be made to Chile on or after the date of enactment of this section.

(2) No sales (including cash sales) may be made and no export license may be issued under the Arms Export Control Act with respect to Chile on or after the date of enactment of this section.

(b) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the total amount of economic assistance which may be made available for Chile during the period beginning July 1, 1976, and ending September 30, 1977, may not exceed \$27,500,000. For purposes of this subsection, economic assistance includes any assistance of any kind which is provided, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit of Chile by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States Government (other than assistance provided under chapter 2, 4, or 5 of part II of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 or credits or guaranties extended under the Arms Export Control Act), but does not include commodities furnished under title II of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. This subsection shall not be construed to authorize the furnishing of any assistance which is prohibited under any other provision of law.

(2) The \$27,500,000 limit set forth in paragraph (1) of this subsection may be increased by not to exceed \$27,500,000 if the President certifies in writing to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate that the Government of Chile—

(A) does not engage in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, prolonged detention without charges or trial, or other flagrant denials of the right to life, liberty, or the security of person;

(B) has permitted the unimpeded investigation, by internationally recognized commissions on human rights (including the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States) of alleged violations of internationally recognized human rights (as described in subparagraph (A) of this paragraph); and

(C) has taken steps to inform the families of prisoners of the condition of and charges against such prisoners.

## U.S. MILITARY AID TO ARGENTINA: SOME FACTS AND FIGURES

Prepared by the Argentine Commission on Human Rights.

In the name of "facilitating a meaningful relationship" with one of the most repressive military regimes in Latin America, the U.S. government is seeking Congressional approval to continue arming and training the Armed Forces of Argentina. This assistance takes several forms: loans for the purchase of weapons and equipment, training of military personnel, cash sales of arms and support materiel, and the stationing of U.S. military advisors in Argentina.

I. LOANS. Under the Foreign Military Sales credit program, more than \$175 million in loans have been granted to Argentina in the past twenty years. \$54 million of these remain in the "pipeline", unspent as of this time. The Carter Administration is requesting another \$15 million for the upcoming Fiscal Year 1978.

Past purchases with these credits by the Argentine military have focused heavily on counter-insurgency equipment and weapons. For example, more than 20 UH-1H army helicopters have been purchased, along with spare parts and maintenance equipment. These helicopters are the standard troop-carrying/gunship craft which were heavily used by the U.S. army in Vietnam. Other purchases under the FMS credit program include C-130E troop transport planes, armoured personnel carriers, 50-caliber machine guns, flamethrowers, A-4B attack aircrafts and river patrol boats.

According to the U.S. State Department, the money now in the pipeline is intended to purchase, among other things, 12 more UH-1H helicopters, 3 more river patrol boats, 50 tactical radios and 10 bulldozers for "civic action" programs of the type that in Vietnam meant forced relocation of entire villages as part of a counter-insurgency program.

Plan for the newly requested \$15 million include more helicopters, communication equipment, artillery and bulldozers.

II. MILITARY TRAINING. More than 2000 members of the Argentine Armed Forces have been trained by the U.S. since 1950. Almost one-third of these have been trained since 1970. The training takes place both within the United States and in the Panama Canal Zone at special counter-insurgency schools such as the Army School of the Americas.

Argentine military personnel have also attended the following training schools in the U.S. between 1970-75: The U.S. Army Infantry and Ranger School, the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Military Government School, the U.S. Army Intelligence School, and the U.S. Army School of the Americas.

600 personnel have attended this last school, located in the Canal Zone. During the 1970-75 period, Defense Department tables show that Argentine officers attended the following courses of instruction:

Command and General Staff	(4)
Urban Counter-insurgency	(7)
Military Intelligence	(7)
Jungle Operations	(2)
Military Intelligence	
Non-commissioned Officer	(5)
Counter-insurgency Operations	(11)
Military Police	(3)
Basic Infantry Officer	(2)
Military Intelligence	
Interrogation	(6)

The Administration is requesting an allocation of \$700,000 for FY78 to continue this training program. The money would cover the training of 186 additional military personnel. An estimated 157 will be trained in the current year.

III. CASH SALES. Under the Foreign Military Sales program the U.S. also sells arms, equipment and training programs to Argentina. The State Department estimates that the cash sales program for Argentina will reach a level equal to that of the FMS credit program, \$15 million. This is a threefold increase over the cash level of the previous year, and suggests that the State Department's much-publicized reduction in the credit program may be little but reshuffling of the figures.

Past purchases by Argentina under the cash sales program have included massive amounts of spare parts and maintenance equipment for helicopters, tanks, aircraft and ships, as well as such materiel as ammunition and floating bridges. A number of counter-insurgency training programs have been sold to Argentina under this program between 1974-75, including courses in Jungle operations, Military Intelligence, and urban warfare.

IV. MILITARY ADVISORS. Despite a Congressional ban on the stationing of U.S. military advisors overseas, the Defense Department is requesting special legislation to allow the Military Group (MilGrp) to remain in Argentina, staffed by 20 U.S. military personnel and 9 Argentine personnel. These advisors work with the U.S. Embassy and the Argentine Armed Forces to implement the arms and equipment sales and training programs described above.

# Fewer Argentines Show Enthusiasm For Military Rule

THE WASHINGTON POST Sunday, April 15, 1977

By Karen DeYoung

Washington Post Foreign Service

**BUENOS AIRES** — When the weather is particularly nice in Buenos Aires, they say it is "Peronist weather." Whenever the late president would appear in public, the legend goes, storm clouds would magically vanish in a blaze of sunshine.

Even those who are convinced that Juan Domingo Peron came close to ruining Argentina — and they are many — say it is true. Call it charisma, machismo or simple demagoguery, for nearly 20 years, both in office and in exile, Peron had the power to move the people.

It is precisely this power that Argentina's current government—a military junta composed of the heads of the army, navy and air force, with army commander Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla as president—does not have. One of the most serious domestic problems now facing the junta is the fact that most Argentines find it, to say the least, uninspiring.

"The biggest problem this government has," said one official within the now emasculated labor movement that once formed the Peronist backbone, "is that there is no enthusiasm for it." Out of fear, "nobody is going to criticize it too strongly. But nobody is going to say anything good about it, either."

It is perhaps axiomatic that military governments are not loved. This particular junta, however, which a year ago ousted Peron's widow, Isabel, at a time when most Argentines agreed that the country was on the road to ruin, started out with a fair amount of good will.

That support has now faded into a sort of dull acceptance of the government's strong-arm power to impose its wishes, and an overriding feeling among labor, academicians and politicians that the country has no real direction. "It's true," one high navy official shrugged, "we have no plan, no big program."

What makes Argentina's military government different from that in Chile and other countries where military rule is more obviously institutionalized, is its refusal to be branded as other than a "transition" government. It is determined to maintain a facade of freedom inside a system of both subtle and blatant repression.

It is conventional wisdom here, however, that the government is divided, not only within the junta itself, but into a maze of subgroups that formulate and carry out their own orders. These groups are vaguely labeled "hard-liners," "moderates," a category into which Videla is usually placed, and the "soft-liners."

The only thing that has united them recently, and even managed to unite a good portion of the populace, was anger at President Carter's cutoff of military credits because of alleged human-rights violations.

The benefits of having many factions are that unpopular actions can be passed off as the work of extremists.

The Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army, or other groups of leftist guerrillas who are generally credited with acts of terrorism, have by nearly all reckonings been completely annihilated. The mighty, seemingly random, bombing attacks in Buenos Aires in recent weeks are considered the crazed actions of cornered desperados.

But the retaliatory paramilitary kidnappings, secret detentions, tortures and deaths that have become a part of terror and an international humiliation to many Argentines continue unabated. Amnesty International says there are at least 3,000 uncharged political prisoners here. Others put the figure as high as 20,000.

Gen. Albano Harguindeguy, the interior minister, who is considered a "hard-liner," has said at various times that there are no more prisoners than half the number of fingers on one hand, that there have never been any prisoners, and that there may have been some but are no more now. Videla says there are no political prisoners, only detained "subversive delinquents."

During recent weeks, a number of prominent civilians have disappeared—kidnappings that, since Videla says his people have no knowledge of

them, are believed to be the work of "hard-liners" disguised with "moderate" concessions.

Earlier this month Edgardo Sajon, a director of La Opinion, a leading Buenos Aires daily and press secretary under former President Alejandro Lanusse, disappeared on his way

to work. After a personal appeal to Videla, Lanusse said the president assured him that neither federal nor provincial police had any clue to Sajon's whereabouts.

A few days later the bullet-ridden body of Hector Perros, a prominent local journalist who had been abducted from his home by uniformed men, was found by the side of a suburban road.

"You can't call it anarchy," said one socialist politician. "It's not even a dictatorship. It's more like a bunch of little dictatorships."

In mid-March, according to diplomatic sources, a group of American travel agents on a government-sponsored tour were stopped by soldiers as their bus left Buenos Aires' international airport. Made to stand spread-eagled against the bus, they were frisked, their luggage was inspected and they were forced to stand on the side of the road while an officer gave them a 30-minute lecture on the fallacy of President Carter's human rights policy.

Junta spokesman acknowledged that incidents may have occurred, but said they had no knowledge of them.

"This is how they convince the world that Argentina is a safe place where human rights are respected," said one Western diplomat grimly. "Not only does the left hand not know what the right is doing, the left forefinger usually hasn't a clue what the left thumb has in mind."

One thing all factions initially agreed upon was giving a year-long free hand to Economy Minister Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz. The results of his free-market policies have been, in many respects, impressive. The only civilian member of the Cabinet, he managed to borrow \$1.2 billion, and to pay off \$200 million in debts. He also bolstered the national treasury, estimated by one junta spokesman to have reached a rock-bottom \$10 million at the time of the coup.

For the man on the street, however, the policy has not been so successful. Wage increases averaging around 30 per cent were not nearly enough to offset inflation that, while recently decreased from nearly 300 per cent in 1975, is still at the triple-digit level.

As one local news magazine headlined last week: "Who's responsible for inflation now?"

At times, it seems the economy minister himself does not know. Last month, he announced a 120-day freeze on prices including gasoline. A week later, gasoline prices doubled and a week after that, taxi fares doubled.

Part of the problem, as nearly everyone freely admits, regardless of political persuasion, is that "Argentines are selfish people."

"Things are not the same here as in places like Peru or Bolivia," said a leader of the Radical Party that, in freer political times, was the loyal opposition. In largely middle-class Argentina, he said, "the problem is not getting enough to eat, it is getting a new car next year," an infinitely more volatile issue.

The political parties and the labor unions, meanwhile, seek an opening for political dialogue with the junta. At present, parties are officially "suspended" and unions, permitted only on a local level, are run by the military.

It had been widely hoped that Videla's March 31 speech, on the anniversary of the coup, would describe such an opening. "Everybody," the Radical leader said, "is waiting to see what happens."

What happened was a call for "national unity" that left the political future, in the words of the political commentator, "as muddy as ever."

While calling the junta "the best government available" to Argentina under current circumstances, a columnist for the English-language Buenos Aires Herald noted dryly that the situation was, in an all, "distressing."

It is likely to get worse before the sun comes out.

THE WASHINGTON POST

Saturday, April 16, 1977

E4

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

# Some Latin Regimes Use Torture

President Carter's aggressive defense of human rights has been rejected by a number of Latin American regimes that still rely on imprisonment, torture and murder to perpetuate themselves in power.

Five Latin American nations, outraged at the Carter administration's criticism of their repressive police states, have refused to accept further American military aid. But this face-saving attempt hasn't stifled the efforts of their people to achieve basic human freedoms.

We have heard the grim stories of many victims who have been brutally mistreated by these military governments. But rarely have we heard a tale as detailed, credible and moving as that of Enrique Rodríguez Larreta.

He is a prominent journalist from one of Uruguay's oldest and most distinguished families. He flew to Buenos Aires last July to trace the disappearance of his 23-year-old son, also a journalist, who had emigrated to Argentina years ago. The anxious father spoke with several officials and wrote numerous letters.

On the night of July 13, a group of armed men dressed in plain clothes bashed in the door of his daughter-in-law, tied hoods over their heads and drove them in their night clothes to a room with about 30 other people.

Through his loosely woven hood, Larreta recognized his son and several other prominent people, including Margarita Michelini, the daughter of a Uruguayan senator who had been assassinated in Buenos Aires, and Leon Durrat, a Uruguayan labor organizer who had disappeared.

The guards began shoving prisoners

upstairs for interrogation. "Because of the piercing screams that I could hear constantly," Larreta told our associate Joseph Spear, "I realized they were being brutally tortured."

The next evening, it was Larreta's turn. "They stripped me completely naked. Tying my hands behind my back, they suspended me by the wrists . . . They put a sort of loincloth on me, on which there were several exposed electrical wires. When that device is plugged in, the victim receives electric shocks at several points simultaneously. This 'machine,' as they call it, is plugged in amidst questions, threats, insults and blows to the most sensitive parts of the body."

Throughout the ordeal Larreta's tormentors asked him questions about the political activities of his son and himself. Larreta reported that his guards "seemed to belong to the Argentine Army," but Uruguayan Army officers also participated in the torture sessions, he said.

At one point, the guards suspended a water-filled tank from the ceiling, tied a prisoner named Carlos Santucho to a rope, and dangled him over the tank. He was "lowered repeatedly into the tank and pulled out again, amidst laughter and insults," Larreta recalls. "After a while, they apparently noticed that Santucho's body showed no signs of life . . . and took him away."

On July 28, Larreta was tied up and thrown into a truck with some other prisoners. They were hauled to a military airport in Buenos Aires, flown to a base near Montevideo, and deposited in an Uruguayan house of torture.

Finally, in late August, the captors

tried to convince their prisoners to take part in a phony guerrilla attack. Afterward, the prisoners would be represented by lawyers at a military trial and would later go to prison. But their lives would be spared.

Fourteen prisoners agreed to the deal; the phony raid was staged, and the captives were paraded before the press. The government officially announced that it had broken up a huge "subversive organization."

Because of Larreta's spotless record and moderate political credentials, the captors could not make a case against him. He was eventually released. His son remains in prison.

Meanwhile, fear is mounting in the armed camp called Argentina, where the military junta, under Gen. Jorge Rafael Videla, must use force to keep its shaky hold on the reins of power. Top Argentine officials, therefore, are unhappy about Carter's human rights offensive. Argentina is a "nation under siege," the generals claim. There's no room, they insist, for normal court procedures.

In Paraguay, hundreds of citizens have been imprisoned and cruelly tortured by police officials paranoid about any hint of opposition. But while the nation's 2.5 million people live in poverty, Gen. Alfredo Stroessner lives like a proverbial king. The greedy dictator has kept Paraguay under a virtual state of siege since 1954, except for the infrequent "elections" which he invariably wins.

Carter's stubborn support of human rights has yet to persuade the dictators of Latin America to ease their oppressive rule.

# Canal Zone School Builds Brotherhood Of Latin Generals

By Richard Gott  
Manchester Guardian

FORT GULICK, Panama Canal Zone—The Bolivian colonel is in full flood as we come into the classroom.

"How can you expect illiterate peasants to limit their families when rich people who ought to know better have lots of children?"

A Mexican colonel interrupts him.

"But look at the size of the slums around our cities. We have to do something. It may be a necessary evil."

The instructor, an Ecuadorian officer, intervenes from the back of the room.

"But how can we interfere with the family, the basic unit of our society?"

These aspiring students of political economy are attending the School of the Americas, a military college run by the United States Army here for the purpose of training the armies of Latin America.

In the past 27 years, since it was founded in 1949, 33,534 Latin American soldiers have passed through its doors. Some have become presidents, many have risen to be chief of staff.

On one wall, among the medals and escutcheons of the armed forces of the continent, there is a framed letter from Gen. Augusto Pinochet, the president of Chile, dated Nov. 6, 1973, less than two months after the overthrow of President Salvador Allende. In it, Pinochet expresses his personal thanks and that of the Chilean army for the work of the school.

In the entrance hall, on the scrolls of honor, the names are recorded of two Chilean officers who graduated cum laude in 1974 after a course in "urban counterinsurgency."

Fort Gulick lies at the north end of the Canal Zone, not far from the town Colon. It overlooks Gatun Lake, the vast stretch of water traversed by the Panama Canal. The damp and the tropical heat is oppressive, but inside the school, built in the old colonial style with high ceilings, wide hallways and mosquito netting, the climate is just about bearable. Outside there are 89 square miles of training grounds, much still virgin forest.

The officers in the classroom, we are told, are taking a course in economics—part of their general staff training. They stay in the Canal Zone for 10 months, receiving similar training to that given to U.S. officers at the Army's staff college at Fort Leavenworth, Kan.

There are large numbers of other courses, particularly of a technical character, and normally there are about 1,500 students a year. The advantage of Fort Gulick is that the courses are given in Spanish, and special attention is given to the particular problems of Latin America.

One such problem is urban guerrilla warfare, which has become a characteristic feature of Latin American societies in the past decade. The U.S. officers recognize that they have had little historical or practical experience of this phenomenon, and the course given for a number of years at the School of the Americas was to some extent a cooperative effort. Latin American students were invited to discuss they way their countries had tried to deal with the problem, and they pooled their information.

According to Capt. Jeff W. Chalmers, the personable young Vietnam veteran charged with coping with the questions of foreign journalists—and who speaks perfect Spanish—"No country is agreed on the tactics for coping with urban insurgency." He says that "the course was very popular."

Recently, however, it came to a premature end. Appalled by the tide of military regimes in Latin America and by the growing and widespread use of torture, Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.) succeeded in halting the teaching of police methods by U.S. agencies abroad.

The School of the Americas found that it could no longer legally continue to offer its urban counterinsurgency course. Chalmers, hardly hiding his distaste, said: "In virtually all countries soldiers have a police role, and we taught them things like how to control the traffic."

He has little time for Harrington—"He has his own ideas but his countrymen don't understand them"—and points out that it was the politicians, not the soldiers, who lost the Vietnam war. He also explains that Harrington has not really put a stop to police

training. For those Latin American armies who wish to send their military police to be trained in U.S. methods, "There exist schools in the United States itself."

Nevertheless, it is apparent from a glance at the catalogue of courses offered at the School of the Americas that the five-month course for military intelligence officers, which includes "interrogation techniques" and "urban and rural counterinsurgency concepts," is designed to bypass the requirements of the Harrington amendment.

Chalmers said, however, that not too much notice should be given to the counterinsurgency training at the school, since the 42-week general staff course includes only 16 hours of counterinsurgency.

Chalmers is unworried by the militaristic trend throughout the continent.

"Historically the governments of Latin America have been military," he said. "Perhaps it serves the interests of their peoples."

He points out that the armies in Latin America are the only institutions that are well organized.

"Perhaps we are helping to organize them well, but if they extend that into the political sphere, that's their affair."

In the past year, the School of the Americas has been modernizing to make itself more attractive and to justify a recent increase in student fees. The money is paid by the Latin American armies concerned—from funds received from the United States.

With the military aid money that Latin American armies receive from the United States, there is a certain amount of choice. Students can be sent either to the Canal Zone or to the United States for training, or the army can use the services of a mobile training team in their own country. Most military men believe that they get best value for money at the School of the Americas, although there is more prestige attached to having studied in the United States.

It is also relatively cheap for the Americans. It only costs \$5 million a year to keep the School of the Americas going in the Canal Zone, and Chalmers and his superiors in the Pentagon are reluctant to contemplate moving it to, say, Florida.

The writing is on the wall, however. Critics of the U.S. military presence in Panama argue that the school and a dozen other military bases in the zone are illegal and Panama is now urging that they be removed. Under the treaty of 1903 that governs relations between the United States and Panama, the United States is permitted "to defend" the canal, but this hardly covers the huge military complex of the U.S. Southern Command, which the Panamanian leader, Gen. Omar Torrijos, has described as "this great colonial encampment."

The brotherhood of Latin-American soldiery, fostered at the School of the Americas, has certainly played a significant part in U.S. influence of the hemisphere.

"Here," says Chalmers, "we are more than soldiers, we are brothers. We all have the same problems, everyone has the freedom to speak openly. The Latin-Americans have grown to feel that the value of this school is that it is the only place where people can meet and discuss without fighting. Indeed sometimes our former students have solved problems over the telephone."

The apparent result has been impressive. With the exception of the 1969 war between Honduras and El Salvador, Latin American states (which have plenty of border conflicts and historical tensions) have not gone to war with each other during the existence of the school.

Chalmers admits to no anxiety about former pupil Pinochet.

"We have relations between the school and military leaders if they've been here. They have money to spend, officers here and they take an interest in the school."

Indeed, there is even an alumni magazine called *Adeante* (Forward). In the current issue there is an article on the conquest of the Argentine Pampa by Maj. William Depalo, an instructor at the school. It refers favorably to the efficiency with which the Argentine army wiped out 14,000 Indians in 1835.

# The Washington Post

MONDAY, APRIL 11, 1977

## Latin American Left, Right Say U.S. Militarized Continent

Second in a Series

By Joanne Omang

Washington Post Foreign Service

BUENOS AIRES—Military governments are so entrenched in South America now that a top guerrilla leader, Nelson Gutierrez of Chile's Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MLR), said from his exile in Sweden last year that he thought it might take 15 years to turn them out.

It would have to be done without help from the Soviet Union, he continued, because "The Soviets aren't willing to risk an armed confrontation with the United States over Latin America."

The U.S. role in militarizing the continent and its continued influence over the situation are widely taken for granted among theoreticians of both the left and the right. That is why repeated U.S. assertions that democratically elected governments would be preferable to the prevalent dictatorships are greeted with derision on the left and incomprehension on the right.

The continent is U.S. turf, the leftists maintain; even the Soviet Union restricts itself to trade and to wooing Peru's government with dirt-cheap arms. Therefore the situation is as the United States wants it to be.

Bolivia would be less repressive, a leftist student there claimed, if American bankers were not so insistent on absolute tranquility and conservatism in their loan prospects.

Social reformers from Colombia to Uruguay routinely invoke alleged Central Intelligence Agency activity as the reason their policies have not caught the public imagination. U.S. funds allegedly aimed at fighting drug traffic really buy guns and helicopters to further domestic repression, according to the leftist North American Conference on Latin America.



HUGO BANZER OF BOLIVIA



AUGUSTO PINOCHET OF CHILE

... South American rulers such as these presidents like to pose in full regalia

The military officers and their supporters, on the other hand, regard their own actions as logical outgrowths of the U.S.-fostered anti-communism. They learned it at the U.S. government's School of the Americas in Panama, and now they do not understand why North Americans fail to see the need for measures as strong as the threat is perceived to be.

Left and right agree, paradoxically, that the current situation owes much to U.S. attitudes. Central in their discussions is the role of the School

of the Americas, which has trained more than 30,000 Latin American officers in dozens of courses since it opened in 1949.

Chile and Peru, a Bolivian officer said recently, are less likely to go to war over their desert frontier than if their top commands had not become friendly in classes at the school.

They have learned everything from jet-engine maintenance and map-reading through electronic communications, counter-insurgency and military administration. The ideas shared there have created a common bond

of information and basic attitudes across the continent.

The ideological approach to governing is new with this generation of soldiers. Earlier military rulers tended to be caudillos bent on personal enrichment or saviors stepping in for the moment, imposing temporary order until the civilians could reorganize.

The School of the Americas steeped young Latin officers in the early-1950s anti-Communist dogma that subversive infiltrators could be anywhere. The notion fit readily into the Brazilian concept of national security, a wholly new theory of government worked out after 1949 at Brazil's Advanced War College.

When the Brazilian officers took power in 1964, they erected their national security state on a bedrock of anti-communism, and the model has since been recreated in Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Chile. Including Paraguay's army-backed one-man rule, 180 million South Americans live under the domination of these ideas.

There are three fundamental concepts, according to an analysis of national security ideas by Belgian theologian Jose Comblin:

- The nation-state, rather than the individual, is seen as the basic unit of politics. Nations are in permanent competition for scarce resources, according to the theory, and forge alliances to conduct wars. The current lineup consists of the clashing non-Communist and Communist forces, and this conflict determines everything else.

- Every human activity is a war activity for or against the national goal which is economic development and maximum cultural, informational and even conversational effort to increase the national power.

- Only the armed forces are coordinated, disciplined and strong enough to guide the nation in this struggle. It is possible for civilians to learn, eventually—but not with their traditional political maneuverings, for compromise is impossible. "It is not just a question of who should govern, but of remaking the nation from the ground up," Comblin said.

This framework has been broad enough to admit both Peruvian Gen. Juan Velasco Alvarado's leftist "Christian, socialist and humanist" revolution in 1968 and Chilean Gen. Augusto Pinochet's moves toward what he recently called "authoritarian democracy."

The Generals feel that the takeovers were forced on them by the incompetence of corrupt elected officials unable to keep their promises.

Broad sectors of the population urged the soldiers to take power in Brazil and Chile and Argentina. Uruguay and Argentina gave the mili-

## LATINS AND YANKEES Continents in Contradiction

tary a free hand against guerrillas the civilians could not stop. Colonels and generals in Brazil, Bolivia, Peru and Chile saw themselves as rescuing their countries from reckless, chaotic spendthrifts.

The national security doctrine not only explains the coordinated anti-leftist activities with which most of the governments in the southern cone have been charged. It almost requires them.

"The invasion of Marxism that we are suffering and the internal subversion we are living through is the principal worry of the Inter-American Defense Council," said council vice president Col. Francisco Poujol of Honduras in November. That and other mutual problems were under discussion "to evaluate later the joint defense plans," he said.



The Washington Post  
Military-ruled countries in black;  
shaded nations have civilian leaders.

Gen. Golbery de Couto Silva, Brazil's top theoretician and No. 2 man in the government, proposed a South Atlantic nations' alliance as early as 1952. The plan was revived and aired again last year during the Cuban incursion in Angola, while the American magazine Defense and Foreign Affairs said five Central American nations were studying a proposal to form a unified joint army "to combat terrorism and subversion."

Chilean and Uruguayan refugees have claimed that they have been arrested and tortured by their own countrymen in Argentina, in defiance of international agreements. Even in Colombia, where a turbulent democracy has so far withstood rumored military restlessness, an intelligence agency report on continental guerrilla activity recommended "coordination of the different intelligent organs on a regional level in Latin America, in order to gain more effective control."

When voices in the press, the church or abroad are raised to protest the human-rights abuses such an all-out war produces, the national security philosophy requires that those who complain be classed with the enemies. "There's no denying that Amnesty International is a Communist organization," said an Argentine colonel after the London-based group criticized abuses in Argentina.

Chile has banned half a dozen foreign correspondents from its territory for allegedly presenting a false, Marxist-inspired view of the country. In virtually every country, dozens of dissident priests have been arrested, tortured, killed or simply disappeared, and their leaders accused circumspectly or openly of Communist tendencies.

In this context, President Carter's proposed cuts in military aid to Argentina and Uruguay were seen as a betrayal. U.S. diplomats had frequently expressed concern about continuing human-rights violations, but the military men assumed that former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger's policy still applied. Although Kissinger said in Chile last June that human-rights abuses had "impaired our relationship" with Chile, he was known to oppose any real economic or political sanctions.

At the moment, no South American military regime has gotten beyond the talking stage in regard to restoring democracy, and existing plans are vague at best. U. S. interest may have shifted from anti-Communist defenses to protection of individual rights, but there are no signs that the change has made it to most of South America.

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